A Step Toward Healing and Empowerment
The restoration of statehood to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has emerged as a pivotal issue in Indian politics, particularly as the region marks six years since the abrogation of Article 370 on August 5, 2019. The buzz around this topic intensified in August 2025, fueled by high-level meetings between President Droupadi Murmu, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Union Home Minister Amit Shah. These discussions, coupled with Chief Minister Omar Abdullah’s persistent advocacy, have reignited hope that J&K may soon regain its status as a full-fledged state. However, the path to restoration is complex, and its implications for governance, particularly the powers of the Chief Minister, are profound. This article examines the process, its potential impact, and the broader context of J&K’s political journey before and after the abrogation of Article 370.
The Process of Restoring Statehood
Restoring statehood to J&K requires repealing the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act of 2019, which bifurcated the erstwhile state into two Union Territories (UTs): J&K and Ladakh. According to Article 3 of the Indian Constitution, Parliament has the authority to form new states or alter the status of existing states and UTs. This process begins with the introduction of a bill in Parliament, which must be recommended by the President, who acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers led by the Prime Minister. The bill must then pass in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, ensuring a democratic yet centralized decision-making process.
The J&K Reorganisation Act, enacted on August 6, 2019, granted the central government significant control over J&K, placing key domains like police, public order, and bureaucratic appointments under the Union Home Minister. The Lieutenant Governor (LG), a central appointee, was given sweeping discretionary powers, including final authority over administrative and legislative decisions under Section 53 of the Act. Repealing this act and restoring statehood would shift the balance of power back to the elected government, reducing the LG’s dominance and empowering the state legislature.
Historical precedents exist for such transitions. Union Territories like Himachal Pradesh (1971), Manipur and Tripura (1972), Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram (1987), and Goa (carved out of Goa, Daman, and Diu in 1987) were granted statehood through parliamentary legislation. These examples underscore the feasibility of restoring J&K’s statehood, though the unique political and security context of J&K adds complexity.
Impact on the Chief Minister’s Powers
The restoration of statehood would significantly enhance the powers of J&K’s elected government, particularly the Chief Minister. Under the current UT framework, the LG holds overriding authority over critical areas such as police, public order, and financial decisions. For instance, Section 36 of the Reorganisation Act requires the LG’s recommendation for any bill involving financial obligations, effectively granting veto power over legislative initiatives. The LG’s control over bureaucratic appointments and security matters further limits the Chief Minister’s ability to govern autonomously.
Restoring statehood would transfer these powers to the elected government. The Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers would gain authority over financial matters, including taxation, borrowing, and expenditure authorization. The state legislature would also wield greater legislative power, covering subjects on the State List and Concurrent List, unlike the current restricted scope under the UT framework. Additionally, the legislature could employ parliamentary mechanisms—questions, debates, no-confidence motions, and committees like those on estimates and public accounts—to ensure executive accountability.
In a state, the Governor’s role is limited, acting primarily on the advice of the Council of Ministers, unlike the LG’s expansive discretionary powers in a UT. This shift would empower Chief Minister Omar Abdullah to address regional needs more effectively, aligning governance with local aspirations. For instance, during his previous tenure (2009–2015), Abdullah’s government demonstrated competence in reducing militancy and improving security, suggesting that a restored statehood could enhance local governance capacity.
Context: Before and After Article 370’s Abrogation
Pre-2019: The Special Status Era
Before August 5, 2019, J&K enjoyed special status under Article 370, which granted it significant autonomy, including its own constitution and exclusive rights over land and jobs under Article 35A. The Chief Minister, as head of the state government, held executive powers over most subjects, except those related to defense, foreign affairs, and communications, which fell under the central government. This autonomy allowed J&K to maintain a distinct identity, though it was often criticized by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as fostering separatism and hindering integration.
The region’s political landscape was turbulent, marked by insurgency since the 1987 state election, which many viewed as rigged. Despite periods of relative stability, such as during Omar Abdullah’s tenure, violence and unrest persisted, particularly in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley. The BJP’s 2014 coalition with the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) aimed to bridge regional divides, but the alliance collapsed in 2018, leading to Governor’s Rule.
Post-2019: The Union Territory Phase
The abrogation of Article 370 and the passage of the J&K Reorganisation Act in 2019 marked a historic shift. The move revoked J&K’s special status, bifurcated the state, and placed it under direct central control. Political leaders like Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti were detained, and a communication blackout was imposed to curb unrest. The central government justified the move as necessary for security, development, and integration, promising that statehood would be restored at an “appropriate time.”
The transition to UT status significantly curtailed the powers of the elected government. The first assembly elections in J&K as a UT, held in 2024, saw a high voter turnout, signaling public faith in democracy. The National Conference (NC), led by Omar Abdullah, secured 42 of 90 seats, forming a coalition government with the Congress and CPI(M). However, the LG’s dominance over key functions continued to limit the government’s authority, prompting renewed calls for statehood.
Recent Developments in 2025
In 2025, the push for statehood gained momentum. On October 16, 2024, the J&K Cabinet, in its first meeting under Omar Abdullah, passed a resolution urging the central government to restore statehood, which was approved by LG Manoj Sinha. Abdullah’s subsequent meetings with PM Modi and Home Minister Shah in October 2024 yielded assurances that the UT status was temporary.
On July 29, 2025, Abdullah wrote to 42 political parties, including Congress, seeking support for a bill to restore statehood during the ongoing Monsoon session of Parliament. He described the delay as a “profound and unsettling” precedent, arguing that statehood is a constitutional right, not a discretionary favor. The Supreme Court’s 2023 directive to restore statehood “as soon as possible” added legal weight to these demands, with a related petition scheduled for hearing on August 8, 2025.
Despite these efforts, no concrete timeline has been provided. Home Minister Shah reiterated in March 2025 that statehood would be restored but avoided specifying when, citing security and stability concerns. Social media speculation, including unverified claims of separating Jammu and Kashmir into distinct states, has added to the uncertainty. However, the Supreme Court’s clarification in 2023 that Ladakh’s UT status would remain unaffected by J&K’s statehood restoration provides some clarity.
The Path Forward: Opportunities and Challenges
Restoring statehood to J&K is not merely a legal or administrative change; it is a step toward healing historical wounds and reinforcing democratic trust. The high voter turnout in the 2024 elections and public condemnation of the Pahalgam terror attack in 2024 reflect a desire for stability and governance aligned with local aspirations. Abdullah’s call for statehood as an “essential course correction” resonates with this sentiment, emphasizing that prolonged UT status undermines federalism.
However, challenges remain. The central government’s cautious approach, driven by security concerns and the BJP’s political strategy, may delay the process. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), still in force, and the LG’s control over security matters complicate governance. Moreover, the BJP’s emphasis on correcting “historical wrongs” through Article 370’s abrogation suggests resistance to fully devolving power.
Conclusion
The restoration of statehood to J&K is a critical step toward empowering its elected government and restoring constitutional rights. By repealing the J&K Reorganisation Act and passing a new bill, the central government can fulfill its promises and strengthen India’s federal structure. For Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, statehood would mean greater authority to address regional challenges, from security to development, without the LG’s overreach. As J&K navigates this transitional phase, the Centre must act swiftly to honor the democratic mandate of its people, ensuring that moments of opportunity do not become, as poet Muzaffar Razmi Kairanavi warned, “centuries of punishment.”
The journey from special status to UT and potentially back to statehood reflects J&K’s complex relationship with India’s federal framework. While the abrogation of Article 370 was a bold move, the restoration of statehood is an equally significant opportunity to rebuild trust and foster inclusive governance. The Centre must seize this moment to demonstrate that integration and empowerment can go hand in hand.
By Rafiq Bin Hamid, The Public TV